SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string,
SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the type
of the alert specified by
value.
SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the
alert specified by
value.
SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form
describing the reason of the alert specified by
value.
SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason of
the alert specified by
value.
When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about a
special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message
and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results in
the communication being canceled).
A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The
"close notify" alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for
non-fatal errors are certificate errors ("certificate expired",
"unsupported certificate"), for which a warning alert may be sent.
(The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The receiving
side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning alert on it
discretion.
Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified by the
TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort.
The following strings can occur for
SSL_alert_type_string() or
SSL_alert_type_string_long():
- "W"/"warning"
- "F"/"fatal"
- "U"/"unknown"
- This indicates that no support is available for this alert
type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.
The following strings can occur for
SSL_alert_desc_string() or
SSL_alert_desc_string_long():
- "CN"/"close notify"
- The connection shall be closed. This is a warning
alert.
- "UM"/"unexpected message"
- An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always
fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper
implementations.
- "BM"/"bad record mac"
- This alert is returned if a record is received with an
incorrect MAC. This message is always fatal.
- "DF"/"decompression failure"
- The decompression function received improper input (e.g.
data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always
fatal.
- "HF"/"handshake failure"
- Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates
that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security
parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.
- "NC"/"no certificate"
- A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not
send a certificate (SSLv3 only).
- "BC"/"bad certificate"
- A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did
not verify correctly, etc
- "UC"/"unsupported certificate"
- A certificate was of an unsupported type.
- "CR"/"certificate revoked"
- A certificate was revoked by its signer.
- "CE"/"certificate expired"
- A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
- "CU"/"certificate unknown"
- Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the
certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
- "IP"/"illegal parameter"
- A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent
with other fields. This is always fatal.
- "DC"/"decryption failed"
- A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it
wasn't an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when
checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.
- "RO"/"record overflow"
- A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more
than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with
more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal.
- "CA"/"unknown CA"
- A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received,
but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message
is always fatal.
- "AD"/"access denied"
- A valid certificate was received, but when access control
was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This
message is always fatal.
- "DE"/"decode error"
- A message could not be decoded because some field was out
of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This
message is always fatal.
- "CY"/"decrypt error"
- A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being
unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or
validate a finished message.
- "ER"/"export restriction"
- A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions
was detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit ephemeral RSA
key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This message is always
fatal.
- "PV"/"protocol version"
- The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate
is recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions
might be avoided for security reasons). This message is always fatal.
- "IS"/"insufficient security"
- Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation
has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure
than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal.
- "IE"/"internal error"
- An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness
of the protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory
allocation failure). This message is always fatal.
- "US"/"user canceled"
- This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated
to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the
handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a
close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a
close_notify. This message is generally a warning.
- "NR"/"no renegotiation"
- Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the
server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of
these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appropriate,
the recipient should respond with this alert; at that point, the original
requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case
where this would be appropriate would be where a server has spawned a
process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security
parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be
difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point.
This message is always a warning.
- "UP"/"unknown PSK identity"
- Sent by the server to indicate that it does not recognize a
PSK identity or an SRP identity.
- "UK"/"unknown"
- This indicates that no description is available for this
alert type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert
message.
ssl(7),
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)
Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the
file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
<
https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.